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[1119] 
Coordination or Consolidation?  
Accountable Care Organizations and  
Antitrust Policy Under the Medicare  
Shared Savings Program 
Michael J. Montgomery* 
The U.S. health care system is expensive, fragmented, poorly organized, and fails too 
often to deliver high quality care that is both accessible and cost efficient. In 2014, 
Americans spent an estimated $3.1 trillion on health care, averaging $9695 per capita and 
accounting for 17.8% of gross domestic product (“GDP”). Over the course of the next 
decade, these figures are projected to increase by an average of 5.8% per year, reaching 
an estimated $5.4 trillion and 19.8% of GDP by 2024. In an effort to curb this 
unsustainable trend of rising health care costs, Congress enacted the Medicare Shared 
Savings Program (“MSSP”) in conjunction with the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) in 
2010. The MSSP created a Medicare framework for Accountable Care Organizations 
(“ACOs”), a new health care delivery model that promotes health care provider 
accountability, cost efficiency, and higher quality care. At the same time, the program 
raises serious antitrust concerns in that it facilitates horizontal integration between 
competitors, thus perpetuating increased concentrations of provider market power that 
allow providers to drive up health care prices. This Note argues that there is a need for 
increased vigilance on the part of Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services in 
regulating ACOs participating in the MSSP to prevent the acquisition and exercise of 
pricing power. Antitrust enforcement alone remains an inadequate solution to the 
problem of provider market power and, accordingly, additional regulatory efforts are 
necessary to promote competition and, at the very least, mitigate and contain the 
anticompetitive effects of health care market consolidation under the MSSP. 
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The U.S. health care system is expensive, fragmented, poorly 
organized, and fails too often to deliver high quality care that is both 
accessible and cost efficient. In 2014, Americans spent an estimated $3.1 
trillion on health care, averaging $9695 per capita and accounting for 
17.8% of gross domestic product (“GDP”).1 Over the course of the next 
decade, these figures are projected to increase by an average of 5.8% per 
year, reaching an estimated $5.4 trillion and 19.8% of GDP by 2024.2 At 
the same time, international comparative studies have shown that 
although the United States spends by far the most on health care, the 
overall quality of care provided is no better, and is in many respects 
worse, than that of most other industrialized countries.3 Indeed, despite 
ranking highest in how healthy its citizens perceive themselves, the 
United States consistently underperforms on most quality measures 
relative to other wealthy and developed countries.4 
 
 1. See Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 2014–2024 Projections of National 
Health Expenditures Data Released (July 28, 2015) (on file with author). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., Health at a Glance 2013: OECD Indicators 107–57 
(2013). 
 4. Id. at 40–41. 
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Health policy experts attribute this excess spending to two major 
factors: (1) misaligned provider incentives and (2) provider consolidation. 
First, under the prevailing “fee-for-service” model for health care 
delivery, physicians and hospitals are paid a fee for each test, procedure, 
or other service performed. The result is that providers are financially 
incentivized to increase the volume of services they deliver, as well as to 
recommend unnecessary, duplicative, or more expensive tests and 
procedures that tend to pay higher insurance reimbursements.5 Thus, 
rather than motivating providers to coordinate care more efficiently, 
reduce costs, and focus on quality, the current system fosters a 
fragmented, wasteful, and dangerous culture of overutilizing health care 
services.6 Second, an ever-growing trend of consolidation among health 
care providers has led to problematic concentrations of market power, 
which dominant providers can and have leveraged to inflate prices and 
frustrate market entry by competitors.7 The consequences of such a lack 
of competition and pricing power are reflected in the already irrational 
pricing of hospital services, which seldom bears any relation to the cost 
or quality of the care provided, and instead fluctuates based on relative 
bargaining power.8 
In an effort to resolve the issues of misaligned provider incentives, 
inefficiency, and fragmentation, Congress passed the Medicare Shared 
Savings Program (“MSSP”) as a part of the Affordable Care Act 
(“ACA”) in 2010.9 The MSSP provides a Medicare framework to 
facilitate the formation of Accountable Care Organizations (“ACOs”), 
groups of health care providers and suppliers that work jointly to manage 
and coordinate the entire continuum of care for defined patient 
populations.10 By offering financial incentives to cut costs and achieve 
quality benchmarks in the treatment of Medicare beneficiaries, ACOs 
under the MSSP promote provider accountability and move health care 
payment and delivery toward a more cost-efficient model that provides 
 
 5. See Inst. of Med. of the Nat’l Acads., Rewarding Provider Performance: Aligning 
Incentives in Medicare 4 (2007) (“The current Medicare fee-for-service payment system is unlikely to 
promote quality improvement because it tends to reward excessive use of services; high-cost, complex 
procedures; and lower-quality care.”).  
 6. See id.; see also Einer Elhauge, Why We Should Care About Health Care Fragmentation and 
How to Fix It, in The Fragmentation of U.S. Health Care: Causes and Solutions 1 (Einer Elhauge 
ed., 2010) (“Individual decision makers responsible for only one fragment of a relevant set of health 
care decisions may fail to understand the full picture, may lack the power to take all the appropriate 
actions given what they know, or may even have affirmative incentives to shift costs onto others.”). 
 7. See Robert Berenson, Addressing Pricing Power in Integrated Delivery: The Limits of 
Antitrust, 40 J. Health Pol., Pol’y & L. 709, 709–10 (2015). 
 8. See Erin C. Fuse Brown, Irrational Hospital Pricing, 14 Hous. J. Health L. & Pol’y 11, 57 
(2014). 
 9. Medicare Shared Savings Program, 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj (2016). 
 10. See Andrew J. Barnes et al., Accountable Care Organizations in the USA: Types, 
Developments and Challenges, 118 Health Pol. 1, 2 (2014). For a further discussion of ACOs, see 
infra Part I. 
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higher quality care.11 However, at the same time, the statutory 
requirements that govern Medicare Shared Savings Program 
Accountable Care Organizations (“MSSP ACOs”) not only encourage, 
but in some respects, arguably require consolidation among providers.12 
Thus, while the MSSP has the potential to shift the U.S. health care 
system toward more cost-efficient and patient-centered care, it 
simultaneously threatens to spur consolidation and further aggravate the 
problem of provider market power.13 
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”),14 the 
administrative agency that oversees the MSSP and other Medicare 
programs, has at least acknowledged the potential for the MSSP to 
advance problematic market power.15 For example, within a set of 
regulatory amendments to the MSSP in 2011, CMS noted that “the 
consolidation of providers to form ACOs could have a significant impact 
on the commercial market,” and that hospitals may “use any market 
power they have to . . . obtain higher rates.”16 However, the resulting 
regulations have done little to nothing to prevent or discourage provider 
consolidation in the formation of MSSP ACOs and, moreover, have not 
done nearly enough to mitigate the potential to exercise market power 
once acquired.17 As opposed to instituting regulatory controls within the 
MSSP, CMS instead deferred and entrusted this issue to federal antitrust 
enforcement.18 To be sure, the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department 
of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) 
(collectively “Antitrust Agencies”) have provided useful guidance 
outlining their antitrust review process, including specific safe harbors19 
and details on what might trigger a more in-depth review.20 Yet, the 
problem with solely relying on this approach is that the efforts of the 
Antitrust Agencies to address consolidation and pricing power in the 
context of ACOs are inherently limited by the resource and fact-
 
 11. See Barnes et al., supra note 10. 
 12. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(b)(2)(D) (2016) (requiring that prospective ACOs have at least 5000 
beneficiaries to be eligible to participate in the MSSP); see also Thomas L. Greaney, Regulators as 
Market-Makers: Accountable Care Organizations and Competition Policy, 46 Ariz. St. L.J. 1, 35 (2014). 
 13. See Greaney, supra note 12, at 22. 
 14. The CMS was created to administer the Medicare Program and the federal portion of the 
Medicaid Program. CMS is also responsible for administering the State Children’s Health Insurance 
Program (“SCHIP”), the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”), and 
several other health-related programs. 
 15. Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,802, 67,841–43 (Nov. 2, 2011) (discussing 
commentator concerns over consolidation and market power encouraged by the MSSP). 
 16. Id. at 67,843. 
 17. See Medicare Shared Savings Program, 42 C.F.R. § 425 (2016). 
 18. See Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations 
Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,026 (Oct. 28, 2011) [hereinafter 
Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy]. 
 19. Id. at 67,032. 
 20. Id. 
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intensive nature of antitrust analysis, as well as the narrow scope of 
remedies available where anticompetitive conduct is found.21 In other 
words, even though providers forming an ACO might have a number of 
compelling justifications to consolidate—and thus, to survive antitrust 
scrutiny—the resulting entity might, nonetheless, end up in a position to 
later raise prices legitimately, or in a way that is difficult for antitrust 
remedies to counteract.22 
Consequently, while antitrust enforcement and policy should 
continue to play a significant role, it should not be the only, or even 
primary, mode of addressing the consolidation and pricing power 
associated with the formation of ACOs. Rather, this Note argues that 
there is a need for increased vigilance on the part of CMS in regulating 
the entry and ongoing behavior of ACOs participating in the MSSP. 
Considering the experimental nature of ACOs and the promise they 
have demonstrated thus far, it is important to emphasize that, to the 
extent possible, additional regulations should not be so overly 
prescriptive as to chill MSSP participation. Instead, new regulations 
should focus on establishing protections that prevent the exercise of 
pricing power and streamline the antitrust review process whenever 
necessary. Given the success and growth of the MSSP in just three 
years,23 CMS could leverage eligibility to participate on a number of 
mandatory disclosures and agreements that aim to mitigate the potential 
harms of exercising market power. In doing so, CMS and the Antitrust 
Agencies could better synergize their regulatory and enforcement 
schemes to strike the appropriate balance between the rigidity of 
mandatory antitrust review and the impracticality of an unused system of 
voluntary review. Antitrust enforcement alone remains an inadequate 
solution to the problem of provider market power. Accordingly, these 
additional regulatory efforts will be necessary to promote competition 
and, at the very least, mitigate and contain the anticompetitive effects of 
health care market consolidation under the MSSP. 
Part I of this Note provides a brief overview of the origins, structure, 
results, and prospects of ACOs under the MSSP. Part II introduces the 
problems associated with provider market power in the health care 
industry and relates these issues to the implementation of the MSSP. It 
then discusses the effectiveness and limitations of the Antitrust Agencies 
in addressing the competitive consequences of provider consolidation 
associated with ACO formation. Part III recommends modifications to 
 
 21. See Greaney, supra note 12, at 38 n.159. 
 22. As discussed below in Part II.B, the increase in a firm’s scale following a merger may result in 
cost-saving efficiencies the Antitrust Agencies must consider in reviewing the transaction’s overall 
anticompetitive potential. See Berenson, supra note 7, at 720. 
 23. Growth and Dispersion of Accountable Care Organizations in 2015, Health Aff. Blog (Mar. 
31, 2015), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/03/31/growth-and-dispersion-of-accountable-care-organizations- 
in-2015-2/. 
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the current MSSP regulatory scheme that focus on leveraging eligibility 
to participate on producing mandatory disclosure and agreements that 
would mitigate the potential harms of ACO provider pricing power. 
I.  Accountable Care Organizations 
This Part provides a general overview of ACOs. First, it explains the 
concept of ACOs, why they were developed, and how they differ from 
similar models of integrated health care delivery. Second, it discusses 
how ACOs are structured and operate in the MSSP. Third, it surveys 
current empirical data available on the success of ACOs and notes 
several key criticisms and challenges the ACO model faces. 
A. ACOs: Theory and Origins 
The concept of the ACO originated largely in response to the 
findings of Professor Elliot S. Fisher and a team of researchers through 
the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care project.24 Published in 2003, a study 
by the Dartmouth researchers documented wide geographic variations in 
health care spending and outcomes across the United States throughout 
the early 1990s.25 Significantly, because this study was based on Medicare 
spending in which prices are fixed, and because it was able to rule out 
other potentially substantial factors such as population health, patient 
preferences, or the cost of malpractice,26 the Dartmouth project found 
that these deviations were instead the result of differences in supply-
sensitive care utilization and practice style.27 What is more, the study 
established that this greater volume of care, and thus higher Medicare 
spending, was associated with neither improved health outcomes nor 
increased access to health care services.28 Accordingly, the Dartmouth 
researchers concluded that by reducing discretionary geographic 
 
 24. See generally Elliott S. Fisher et al., The Implications of Regional Variations in Medicare 
Spending. Part 1: The Content, Quality, and Accessibility of Care, 138 Annals Internal Med. 273 
(2003) [hereinafter Fisher et al., Regional Variations Part 1] (determining if regions with enhanced 
Medicare spending provide better care); Elliott S. Fisher et al., The Implications of Regional Variations 
in Medicare Spending. Part 2: Health Outcomes and Satisfaction with Care, 138 Annals Internal 
Med. 288 (2003) [hereinafter Fisher et al., Regional Variations Part 2] (determining if regions with 
enhanced Medicare spending achieve better survival, functioning, and patient satisfaction). 
 25. Fisher et al., Regional Variations Part 1, supra note 24; Fisher et al., Regional Variations Part 
2, supra note 24.  
 26. Differences in the malpractice environment account for less than ten percent of state 
variations in spending. See Fisher et al., Regional Variations Part 1, supra note 24, at 285–86. 
 27. Supply-sensitive care is a category of discretionary care that varies with a populations per 
capita supply of health care resources. In other words, the Dartmouth study showed that where there 
were more hospital beds per capita, patients in higher spending regions were hospitalized more 
frequently, and that where there were more intensive care unit (“ICU”) beds or computed 
tomography (“CT”) scanners available, more patients would be cared for in the ICU or receive CT 
scans. Id. at 286. 
 28. Id. at 273. 
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variations in the volume of services provided, the United States could cut 
Medicare spending by approximately thirty percent without adversely 
impacting health outcomes.29 
Responding to these findings, the Dartmouth researchers 
formulated an organizational model intended to restructure the delivery 
of health care, as well as shift financial incentives in a way that would move 
high-spending geographic regions toward the practices of more cost-
efficient ones.30 The embodiment of this vision was the ACO, a term 
coined by Professor Fisher at a public meeting of the Medicare Payment 
Advisory Commission (“MedPAC”) in 2006.31 While providers may form 
either public or private ACOs, the basic construct envisions a local entity 
consisting of a set of health care providers, including primary care 
physicians, specialists, and hospitals, that are “accountable for the cost 
and quality of the entire continuum of care delivered to a defined 
population.”32 Private ACOs can take on manifold organizational and 
operational structures, and are outside the scope of this Note.33 In 
comparison, most public ACOs are structured and governed under the 
framework of the MSSP, as discussed below in Part I.B.34 
The general concept of an MSSP ACO is perhaps best illustrated by 
a comparison to Health Management Organizations (“HMOs”), in that 
they offer a network of providers, who will have financial incentives to 
economize on care.35 There are, however, significant differences between 
MSSP ACOs and HMOs.36 First, providers, not insurers, control MSSP 
ACOs, and beneficiaries can go to providers outside of their networks.37 
Second, providers in MSSP ACOs do not bear nearly as much financial 
risk as providers in HMOs, who carry as much as 100% of the risk if 
 
 29. Id. 
 30. See generally Transcript of Public Meeting of the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission 
(Nov. 8, 2006). 
 31. See id. at 326; see also Elliott S. Fisher et al., Creating Accountable Care Organizations: The 
Extended Hospital Medical Staff, 26 Health Aff. w44 (2007). 
 32. See Greaney, supra note 12, at 6. 
 33. For a discussion of the various structures of private ACOs, see Valerie A. Lewis et al., ACO 
Contracting with Private and Public Payers: A Baseline Comparative Analysis, 20 Am. J. Managed 
Care 1008, 1009 (2014).  
 34. See infra Part I.B. The other less prevalent ACO models include: (1) the Pioneer ACO 
Model; (2) the Advance Payment ACO Model; and (3) the Next-Generation ACO Model. For more 
information on these models, see Innovation Models, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 
https://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives (last visited Apr. 8, 2016). 
 35. HMOs are a type of managed care organization (“MCO”) that emerged in the United States 
in the 1980s with the goal of lowering costs while improving quality. The basic structure consisted of 
integrating the insuring of patients with managing the provision of health care to those patients. The 
HMO model has faced criticisms for the reimbursement and management frameworks which exacted a 
large degree of control over physician autonomy and placed much of the financial risk on physicians. 
See Barnes et al., supra note 10, at 4. 
 36. See Barnes et al., supra note 10, at 4–6; see also Greaney, supra note 12, at 5–7. 
 37. See Greaney, supra note 12, at 5–7. 
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under global capitation arrangements.38 Third, MSSP ACOs consist of 
groups of providers who are directly incentivized through financial 
rewards to improve performance, as opposed to HMOs where providers 
are mandated to perform a specific way and share a portion of savings 
with the HMO.39 Finally, MSSP ACOs are more truly integrated, 
operating around shared electronic records, health care guidelines, 
quality metrics, and pricing information in a manner that is rare among 
HMOs.40 As a result, MSSP ACOs have an increased emphasis on 
incentivizing providers to coordinate care and work toward measurable 
outcomes.41 Through emphasizing primary care, integrating delivery 
systems, pooling resources, and coordinating care, the MSSP ACO model 
thus aims to realize care that is not only more efficient and cost-effective, 
but also of better quality. 
However, while attractive in theory, implementation of the MSSP 
ACO model has met resistance and implicates a number of practical 
challenges.42 For example, ACO participants, for the most part, continue 
to be paid on a fee-for-service basis, meaning conflicts of interests might 
arise where hospitals own and operate an ACO.43 For example, 
notwithstanding the potential for shared savings, successful ACOs save 
money by reducing unnecessary care, which means that hospitals may 
stand to lose revenue when ACOs succeed.44 Similar concerns arise with 
respect to high-earning specialists who have far more compelling 
incentives to maintain high volumes (and incomes), than do, for example, 
primary care physicians who use less sophisticated and much less 
expensive technology.45 Furthermore, the financial and clinical integration 
of diverse groups of entities consisting of physicians in various specialties 
raises the question of how to fairly redistribute shared savings earnings in 
a manner that can reasonably incentivize a range of health care providers 
in a given ACO.46 Policy experts have also posited that providers’ main 
purpose in forming ACOs might not be to achieve shared savings at all, 
 
 38. See Barnes et al., supra note 10, at 5. 
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Fisher et al., supra note 31, at w45. See generally Wasif Ali Khan, Accountable Care 
Organizations: A Response to Critical Voices, 14 Depaul J. Health Care L. 309 (2012) (arguing that 
despite challenging criticisms, MSSP and CMS-sanctioned ACOs can be successful). 
 43. See Farzad Mostashari, Health Reform and Physician-Led Accountable Care: The Paradox of 
Primary Care Physician Leadership, 311 JAMA 1855, 1855 (2014) (explaining that although hospital-
based ACOs also receive shared savings for reducing unnecessary care, those cost reductions are lost 
revenue for the hospital). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Jeff Goldsmith, Accountable Care Organizations: The Case for Flexible Partnerships Between 
Health Plans and Providers, 30 Health Aff. 32, 33 (2011). 
 46. See id. at 35 (noting that the ability to redistribute incomes within physician communities was 
“a challenge that doomed many provider-sponsored managed care efforts in the past”); see also 
Greaney, supra note 12, at 9–10. 
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but to consolidate and strengthen market power to raise prices.47 
Moreover, even where market power is not the primary motivation for a 
new ACO, it can easily become a difficult to reverse by-product of 
otherwise procompetitive consolidation permitted between large 
providers.48 
While these are real concerns, proponents of the ACO model stress 
that these obstacles are surmountable and should not preclude the 
organizations from realizing their potential benefits.49 For example, 
Francis J. Crosson, M.D., a senior fellow at the Kaiser Permanente 
Institute for Health Policy, contends that the ACO concept is “too vitally 
important to fail”—that the model remains the last best hope for a 
market-driven rationalization of our health care system.50 If the misaligned 
incentives in health care do not change, Dr. Crosson and other health 
policy analysts warn, payers will likely be forced into systematic 
reductions in payment rates to providers. In response, under the current 
fee-for-service environment, providers would likely seek to balance these 
lower rates by increasing their output of services.51 Thus, it is perhaps “in 
our common interest” to see that ACOs succeed and deliver on their 
promise of better care at a lower cost.52 The next Subpart discusses in 
depth how ACOs are formed, structured, and operated under the MSSP 
to achieve these goals. 
B. The Medicare Model: ACOs Under the MSSP 
The MSSP, authorized under the ACA, establishes a statutory 
framework to test and promote the formation of ACOs serving defined 
populations of Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries.53 In exchange for 
reducing medical costs and maintaining quality of care at or beyond 
standards specified by CMS, MSSP ACO providers and suppliers receive 
a percentage share of any cost savings to Medicare.54 The goal is that 
these “shared savings” will incentivize and encourage providers to 
 
 47. See Clark C. Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, The Provider Monopoly Problem in Health 
Care, 89 Or. L. Rev. 847, 872 (2011). 
 48. See Berenson, supra note 7, at 720. 
 49. Francis J. Crosson, The Accountable Care Organization: Whatever Its Growing Pains, the 
Concept Is Too Vitally Important to Fail, 30 Health Aff. 1250, 1253 (2011).  
 50. Id. at 1250. 
 51. Greaney, supra note 12, at 10. 
 52. Crosson, supra note 49, at 1254. 
 53. Barry R. Furrow et al., Health Law: Cases, Materials, and Problems 802–03 (7th ed. 
2013). Medicare beneficiaries are “attributed” to the primary care physician from whom they receive 
most of their primary care services and assigned to that physician’s ACO. Id. at 803. It is also worth 
noting that a beneficiary is not restricted from receiving health benefits from providers outside the 
ACO to which she is assigned. See 42 C.F.R. § 425.402 (2016) (“Basic Beneficiary Assignment 
Methodology”); see also Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Shared Savings and Losses and 
Assignment Methodology Specifications 12 (2015). 
 54. Medicare Shared Savings Program, 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(d)(2) (2016). 
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implement various service delivery reforms, including the effectuation of 
evidence-based medicine, shared electronic health records, joint governance 
and decisionmaking, and the coordination of care.55 As discussed below, 
while participating ACOs share some core requirements, the resulting 
entities can look very different both in structure and organization. 
In a broad sense, the MSSP requires participating ACOs to promote 
accountability, encourage investment in infrastructure, coordinate the 
provision of services, and redesign care processes for high quality and 
cost-efficient service delivery.56 Accordingly, the MSSP establishes a 
number of eligibility requirements, including that ACOs have: (1) at least 
5000 Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries and sufficient primary care 
physicians for the number of beneficiaries; (2) a formal legal structure 
that would allow the ACO to receive and distribute payments for shared 
savings; (3) a leadership and management structure that includes clinical 
and administrative systems; and (4) processes to promote evidence-based 
medicine, report on quality and cost measures, and coordinate care.57 
These criteria—particularly the minimum beneficiary and reporting 
requirements—suggest that the MSSP favors larger, more complex 
providers such as hospitals.58 Unless partnering with a hospital, small to 
mid-size practices such as a group of physicians would have to make 
significant investments to develop the infrastructure necessary to qualify 
for the MSSP. 
However, despite the fixed eligibility requirements, there is some 
flexibility as to how MSSP ACOs may organize themselves in terms of 
membership, legal structure, and governance. First, so long as it satisfies 
the eligibility prerequisites, the MSSP ACO may consist of any number 
and assortment of provider participants, including hospitals, physicians, 
or specialty groups.59 For example, the MSSP ACO may be an entire 
regional hospital system that owns all participating hospitals and 
physician practices, an integrated delivery network that also owns health 
plans, or a joint venture arrangement between hospitals and physician 
practice groups.60 Alternatively, an MSSP ACO might take the form of a 
single independent medical practice association of physicians or a multi-
specialty group practice that owns no hospitals at all.61 Second, an MSSP 
ACO’s legal entity may be structured a variety of ways, including as a 
 
 55. See Furrow et al., supra note 53, at 803. 
 56. Medicare Shared Savings Program § 1395jjj(a)(1). 
 57. Id. § (b)(2). 
 58. See Christopher Bays, Scenario Analysis for ACOs and Antitrust 23 (Seton Hall L., Working 
Paper No. 151, 2012). 
 59. See Medicare Shared Savings Program § 1395jjj. 
 60. See Benjamin Holland Able, The Stark Physician Self-Referral Law and Accountable Care 
Organizations: Collision Course or Opportunity to Reconcile Federal Anti-Abuse and Cost-Saving 
Legislation?, 26 J.L. & Health 315, 318–20 (2013). 
 61. Id. at 318–19. 
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corporation, foundation, partnership, or any other form permitted by 
state law.62 Lastly, the MSSP requires that the ACO formed establish a 
separate legal entity with a unique tax identification number (“TIN”) 
and a governing body of its own.63 Participants of an ACO must control 
at least seventy-five percent of that governing body, including at least 
one Medicare beneficiary that does not have a conflict of interest with 
the ACO.64 
Finally, MSSP ACOs may choose between three risk models of 
potential gain sharing and loss, where the more downside risk an ACO is 
willing to take on, the higher the maximum percentage of shared savings 
it can potentially earn.65 In the one-sided model (“Track One”), ACOs 
bear no financial risk, but are only eligible to receive up to fifty percent 
of total shared savings.66 By contrast, ACOs participating in Track Two 
share in up to sixty percent of any savings or losses realized, and those in 
Track Three share the most financial risk at up to seventy-five percent of 
losses or savings.67 CMS determines the total amount of savings an ACO 
will actually retain based on a combination of factors. First, CMS 
calculates the shared savings or losses relative to a benchmark estimating 
the total fee-for-service expenditures beneficiaries would have paid in 
the absence of the ACO.68 Second, it determines the percentage of 
shared savings in each track based on the ACO’s performance on thirty-
three quality metrics.69 Lastly, CMS adjusts for the relevant minimum 
and maximum savings or loss rates—percentages of the benchmark an 
ACO’s savings or losses must exceed to begin qualifying as savings or 
loss.70 Thus far, the overwhelming majority of MSSP ACOs have been 
reluctant to take on financial risk, and consequently, most opted for and 
remain in the one-sided risk model.71 The next Subpart surveys data on 
how these ACOs have fared in operating under the MSSP thus far. 
 
 62. Id. at 318. 
 63. See Medicare Shared Savings Program, 42 C.F.R. § 425.104(b) (2016) (“An ACO formed by 
two or more ACO participants, each of which is identified by a unique TIN, must be a legal entity 
separate from any of its ACO participants.”). But see id. § 425.104(c) (“An ACO formed by a single 
ACO participant may use its existing legal entity and governing body, provided it satisfies the other 
requirements in §§ 425.104 and 425.106.”).  
 64. See id. § 425.106(c)(1)–(3).  
 65. See id.  
 66. Id. § 425.604(d). 
 67. Id. §§ 425.606(d), 425.604(d). 
 68. Id. §§ 425.604(d), 425.606(d), 425.610(d) (outlining how to calculate shared savings in each 
respective track). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Medicare Shared Savings Program 2013 Quality 
Results (Sept. 23, 2014), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/ 
sharedsavingsprogram/Downloads/MSSP-PY1-Quality-Performance.pdf. 
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C. MSSP Results and Prospects for Success 
While the performance of MSSP ACOs throughout the first two 
years of the program is promising, the results have been mixed.72 Of the 
220 MSSP ACOs that participated in 2013, most operated under Track 
One, with fifty-eight (twenty-six percent) being able to reduce spending 
enough to qualify for a total shared savings of $315 million.73 Roughly 
another fifty ACOs reduced spending compared to their benchmarks, 
but not enough to qualify for shared savings.74 Of the few MSSP ACOs 
that opted for Track Two, one exceeded its benchmark by $10 million 
and owed shared losses of $4 million back to CMS.75 Two others, 
however, each saved Medicare $20 million and $8.5 million, pocketing 
$12 million and $5 million, respectively.76 Collectively, MSSP ACOs were 
able to reduce spending by $705 million below their financial 
benchmarks and, accounting for any losses, saved the Medicare Trust 
Fund $383 million.77 As for quality performance, MSSP ACOs were able 
to improve in twenty-seven of thirty-three quality measures compared to 
fee-for-service Medicare.78 
In 2014, 333 ACOs participated in the program, with all but three 
ACOs operating under the Track One model.79 Of these 333 ACOs, 
ninety-two contained spending at $806 million below their targets, 
earning shared savings payments of more than $341 million.80 Additionally, 
no Track Two ACOs owed CMS losses in 2014, and in total, the MSSP 
saved the Medicare Trust Fund a net $465 million.81 No ACOs are 
currently participating in Track Three, which was finalized in the August 
2015 regulations82 and only became available for MSSP contract years 
beginning in 2016. 
These early results can either be promising or disappointing, 
depending on one’s perspective.83 On the one hand, about a quarter of 
 
 72. See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Medicare Shared Savings Program Performance 
Year 1 Results (Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/ 
sharedsavingsprogram/Downloads/MSSP-PY1-Final-Performance-ACO.pdf; see also Ctrs. for Medicare & 
Medicaid Servs., supra note 71. 
 73. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Medicare ACOs Provide Improved Care While Slowing 
Cost Growth in 2014 (Aug. 25, 2015), https://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-
sheets/2015-Fact-sheets-items/2015-08-25.html. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 72. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Medicare Shared Savings Program, 42 C.F.R. § 425 (2015). 
 83. Scott Heiser et al., Unpacking the Medicare Shared Savings Proposed Rule: Geography and 
Policy, Health Aff. Blog (Jan. 22, 2015), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/01/22/unpacking-the-medicare- 
shared-savings-proposed-rule-geography-and-policy/.  
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participating ACOs in 2013 achieved shared savings in their first year, 
reducing the overall cost of care for MSSP ACO beneficiaries by 
approximately one percent.84 And on an especially positive note, the 2014 
results reflected that ACOs with more experience in the program are 
much more likely to generate shared savings, suggesting that increased 
success under MSSP programs may only be a matter of time.85 On the 
other hand, approximately three-quarters of participating ACOs either 
failed to lower spending or did not exceed the minimum savings rate, and 
failure to meet quality reporting requirements resulted in ACOs leaving 
millions in shared savings on the table.86 To put this into perspective, 
under the more rigorous quality benchmark standards that will take 
effect in Year Three of the program, CMS would have withheld an 
additional $71.1 million of the shared savings distributed in 2013.87 Thus, 
while MSSP ACOs generally did well above average for quality, they 
stand to lose a significant portion of their expected shared savings if 
providers do not make significant improvements in cost and quality 
performance. Considering that mandatory transition from one-sided to 
two-sided risk models, the sustainability of the entire program could be 
at risk if long-term financial success remains an uncertainty for 
prospective participants.88 
Another looming concern is whether CMS can strike a balance 
between serving its reform goals of lower costs and higher quality health 
care in the Medicare program while also preventing anticompetitive 
spillover into the private sector such as cost shifting.89 While there are 
shared common interests in promoting higher quality care at lower costs, 
the regulatory mission of CMS is centered on advancing the goals of 
Medicare, and it is at least questionable whether the MSSP will go out of 
its way to protect the interest of the private market.90 More specifically, 
MSSP ACOs rely upon administrative pricing and command regulation 
to control costs, and can be regulated with little concern over promoting 
provider competition.91 As a result, in a market where providers are 
consolidating and aggregating excess market power in the form of ACOs, 
it makes good economic sense that dominant providers with extant 
market power might raise prices for private payers to account for lower 
 
 84. Mark McClellan et al., Early Evidence on Medicare ACOs and Next Steps for the Medicare ACO 
Program, Health Aff. Blog (Jan. 22, 2015), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/01/22/early-evidence-on- 
medicare-acos-and-next-steps-for-the-medicare-aco-program/.  
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. David Muhlestein & Chase Hall, ACO Quality Results: Good but Not Great, Health Aff. 
Blog (Dec. 18, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/12/18/aco-quality-results-good-but-not-great/. 
 88. 42 C.F.R. § 425.600(b) (2016) (“ACOs may operate under the one-sided model for a 
maximum of two agreement periods.”). 
 89. Greaney, supra note 12, at 15. 
 90. Id. at 17. 
 91. Id. 
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reimbursements under Medicare programs.92 As discussed below, 
competition policy surrounding MSSP ACOs has done little to account 
for the risks and implications of facilitating market consolidation. 
Although the shared savings model offers a promising transition from 
traditional fee-for-service to value-based reimbursements that incentivize 
efficiency and quality care, this transformation might prove detrimental 
if regulators fail to aggressively prevent or at the least address and 
mitigate increasing provider market power. 
II.  ACOs, Antitrust, and Competition Policy 
While aggregation does not generally equal accountability, success 
under the MSSP ACO model is to some extent premised on the size and 
scale of participating organizations. ACOs must be sufficiently large to 
efficiently provide the entire continuum of care to a population; they 
need to have the structural framework and capital resources to build 
infrastructure and make the investments necessary to achieve 
integration; and they need to administer collaborative care that 
implements evidence-based medicine, electronic health records, and 
quality metrics, all of which must be measured and analyzed to assess 
past performance and set future goals. In other words, the MSSP 
presupposes at least some degree of provider consolidation in achieving 
its vision of integrated and coordinated care.93 
Accordingly, although Congress enacted the MSSP to promote 
efficiency and other benefits of vertical integration for Medicare and its 
beneficiaries, the program raises serious antitrust concerns in that it 
facilitates horizontal integration between competitors, thus perpetuating 
increased concentrations of provider market power.94 Where providers 
have market power and face less competition, they can and do charge 
substantially higher prices, regardless of whether they are not-for-profit. 
These increased prices are generally passed off to consumers in the form 
of higher insurance premiums, increased cost sharing, and overall 
reductions in compensation for those with employer health benefit 
plans.95 Furthermore, while Medicare administratively sets public health 
prices and generally is not susceptible to pressure from market power, 
most MSSP ACOs consist of providers that operate in both the public 
and the private market. In other words, if provider consolidation among 
large MSSP ACO participants is left unchecked, the market power of the 
resulting entity could allow it to raise prices in the private sector that 
counteract and overwhelm the goal of reducing costs under the MSSP. 
 
 92. See id. at 18–19. 
 93. See Havighurst & Richman, supra note 47, at 871–72. 
 94. See id. at 872. 
 95. Martin Gaynor, Competition Policy in Healthcare Markets: Navigating the Enforcement and 
Policy Maze, 33 Health Aff. 1088, 1090 (2014). 
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This Part introduces antitrust concerns surrounding provider 
consolidation in the health care industry and discusses how the Antitrust 
Agencies have approached health care antitrust enforcement. First, it 
discusses the problems of excess market power and how it can lead to 
anticompetitive behavior such as supracompetitive pricing and collusion. 
It then provides an overview and analysis of how both the courts and the 
Antitrust Agencies have treated health care consolidation, concluding 
that antitrust regulation should not be the only, nor the primary, tool in 
curtailing consolidation under the MSSP. 
A. Antitrust Concerns: Market Power, Collusion, and Unfair 
Competition 
This Subpart introduces the problems associated with provider 
consolidation and market power in the health care industry and relates 
these issues to the implementation of the MSSP. First, it provides a 
background on the direct relationship between provider market power 
and health care prices, explaining how the MSSP could potentially 
contribute to the problem and impact the private sector. It then 
highlights the risks that come with direct competitors exchanging large 
quantities of information on a regular basis, including potentially 
anticompetitive behavior such as collusion and price fixing. 
1. Provider Consolidation and Market Power 
Provider consolidation and market power pose the biggest obstacles 
to the success of the MSSP. Over the past several decades, providers 
have substantially increased hospital concentration, leaving the vast 
majority of Americans subject to monopoly power in their local hospital 
markets.96 According to studies by health economists William Vogt and 
Robert Town, there is a strong correlation between hospital market 
concentration and the growing costs of health insurance, with hospital 
consolidation in the 1990s being responsible for inpatient price increases 
of at least five and as much as forty percent or more where nearby 
hospitals merged.97 In a more recent study, the Massachusetts Attorney 
General documented the effects of provider leverage on health care costs 
and insurance premiums, finding that “wide disparities in prices are not 
explained by differences in quality [or] complexity of services . . . [but] 
instead . . . reflect relative market leverage of health insurers and health 
 
 96. Barak D. Richman, Am. Enterprise Inst., Beyond Repeal and Replace: Concentration in 
Health Care Markets: Chronic Problems and Better Solutions 9 (2012). 
 97. See Claudia H. Williams et al., Synthesis Project, How Has Hospital Consolidation 
Affected the Price and Quality of Hospital Care?, 1, 4 (2006); see also Greaney, supra note 12, at 
20. 
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providers.”98 Such increased concentrations of market power translate to 
excess bargaining power, enabling dominant providers to raise prices or 
reduce quality and innovation without consequence.99 
Because MSSP ACOs might well encourage some mergers, joint 
ventures, and alliances that otherwise might not take place, they can 
exacerbate the problem of market concentration and reduce competition.100 
This dynamic is made worse by the fact that large hospitals have so far 
been the dominant providers in the formation of many MSSP ACOs.101 
For example, in 2013, CMS approved for MSSP participation an 
integrated physician organization in Houston, Texas that included two 
previously independent hospitals, establishing an ACO with a thirty-four 
percent share of the local inpatient market.102 Often deemed “must-have 
providers,” these large hospitals carry additional leverage against health 
insurers in that consumers will refuse to purchase insurance plans that do 
not include them within their network.103 With ACOs thus far being 
dominated by large hospitals, “the likely result will be a concentration of 
power not in the most efficient and highest quality health care 
organizations, but in the largest—simply because they control large 
segments of the market share.”104 
At the same time, the unique characteristics of health care markets 
place dominant providers in an even stronger bargaining position to 
markup health care prices, practically eliminating any constraints on 
pricing that might ordinarily be tied to consumers’ willingness or ability 
to pay.105 Even in the absence of monopoly, the combination of health 
insurance and a lack in price transparency enables and encourages 
consumers and providers to overspend on costly health care by shielding 
them from and largely removing the immediate cost factor from 
treatment decisions that are paid for by insurers.106 To add to this, for 
legal and regulatory reasons, health insurers in the United States must 
typically reimburse whatever service is deemed “medically necessary” 
 
 98. Mass. Att’y Gen., Examination of Health Care Cost Trends and Cost Drivers Pursuant 
to G.L. c. 118G, § 6½ (b) (2011). 
 99. See Havighurst & Richman, supra note 47, at 871–72. 
 100. Thomas L. Greaney, Accountable Care Organizations—The Fork in the Road, 364 New Eng. 
J. Med., at e1(1), e1(2) (2011). 
 101. Shaun E. Werbelow, Note, Rule of Reason Without a Rhyme: Using “Big Data” to Better 
Analyze Accountable Care Organizations Under the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 90 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 361, 380 (2015). 
 102. See Christopher Lloyd, Moving Ahead with Memorial Hermann ACO and Beyond, Memorial 
Hermann Physician Network Newslink, Winter 2013, at 1; see also Werbelow, supra note 101, at 379. 
 103. Robert A. Berenson et al., The Growing Power of Some Providers to Win Steep Payment 
Increases from Insurers Suggests Policy Remedies May Be Needed, 31 Health Aff. 973, 973 (2012). 
 104. Rita E. Numerof, Why Accountable Care Organizations Won’t Deliver Better Health Care—
and Market Innovation Will, Backgrounder, Apr. 18, 2011, at 2. 
 105. See Havighurst & Richman, supra note 47, at 862. 
 106. Id. 
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and “cannot refuse to pay the high prices imposed by health care 
organizations, even when the price exceeds the likely value of the service 
to the patient.”107 Indeed, due to confidentiality clauses and “gag clauses” 
in provider insurer contracts, these prices are seldom disclosed to the 
public, individual patients, or even the physicians that refer or provide 
the health care services, and are often protected as trade secrets.108 
Although increases in pricing power might not impact Medicare’s 
negotiated rates directly, they will have serious implications for the 
private market. Because CMS dictates its own reimbursement rates to 
doctors and hospitals, MSSP ACOs cannot exert market power by simply 
raising Medicare prices. Medicare’s rates notwithstanding, most ACOs 
are expected to operate in both the public and private market. As a 
result, even if MSSP ACO providers are unable to use their market 
power to increase prices for reimbursements to Medicare, there remains 
a legitimate concern that they will then be able to shift costs to private 
non-Medicare health insurance plans, and indeed, even be rewarded in 
the form of shared savings.109 Moreover, Medicare is not without a stake 
in these outcomes, as private market competition can have significant 
impacts on Medicare programs, the MSSP included.110 To be sure, in a 
study on the effect of provider concentration on Medicare payments, 
MedPAC found that high hospital margins on private payer patients lead 
to more construction and higher hospital costs, and that “when non-
Medicare margins are high, hospitals face less pressure to constrain 
costs.”111 MedPAC concluded that this association explains why hospital 
Medicare margins tend to be low in the most concentrated markets, 
while margins are higher where competition is greater.112 In addition, low 
Medicare margins resulting from exercises of market power by dominant 
providers may lead to higher Medicare costs because updates to hospital 
administered pricing under prospective payment are sensitive to these 
margins.113 Ultimately, if the risks of provider consolidation and market 
concentration—justified under the auspices of the MSSP—are not 
adequately addressed, they could undermine the very crux of the 
 
 107. See Barak D. Richman & Kevin A. Schulman, A Cautious Path Forward on Accountable Care 
Organizations, 305 JAMA 602, 602 (2011). 
 108. See Morgan A. Muir et al., Clarifying Costs: Can Increased Price Transparency Reduce 
Healthcare Spending?, 4 Wm. & Mary Pol’y Rev. 319, 327 (2013). 
 109. See Havighurst & Richman, supra note 47, at 875. 
 110. See Thomas L. Greaney, Medicare Advantage, Accountable Care Organizations, and 
Traditional Medicare: Synchronization or Collision? 15 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 37 (2014); 
see also Medicare Payment Advisory Comm’n, Report to the Congress: Assessing Alternatives to 
the Sustainable Growth Rate System, at xiv, 93–94 (2014). 
 111. See Greaney, supra note 110, at 53; see also Medicare Payment Advisory Comm’n, supra note 110. 
 112. See Greaney, supra note 110; see also Medicare Payment Advisory Comm’n, supra note 110. 
 113. See Greaney, supra note 110, at 54; see also Medicare Payment Advisory Comm’n, supra note 110. 
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program and in turn, reduce or eliminate competitive incentives to 
increase access and quality and lower costs.114 
2. Horizontal Price Fixing and Collusion 
The consolidation of providers into ACOs also increases the risks of 
horizontal price fixing, which “result[s] when competitors selling the 
same products or services in the same or overlapping geographic 
markets, agree, either directly or through a common agent negotiating on 
their behalf, on the prices they will charge for their products or 
services.”115 The risk of horizontal price fixing and other forms of 
collusion is especially prominent among ACOs, which by definition are 
encouraged to integrate, collaborate, and share information that might 
include prices.116 Because ACOs are typically comprised of otherwise 
independent competing providers, encouraging this collaboration might 
incentivize and allow providers to fix prices when negotiating contracts 
with commercial health plans.117 Although CMS administratively sets 
provider reimbursement rates for Medicare beneficiaries, most MSSP 
ACOs are expected to operate in both public and private markets, and 
thus, even those ACOs participating in the MSSP can present a 
heightened risk of horizontal price fixing and price collusion.118 
Considering that price fixing arrangements and other forms of 
collusion implicated by the MSSP are per se illegal under the Sherman 
Act,119 some might argue that existing antitrust laws are sufficient to deter 
ACOs from engaging in this behavior.120 As discussed below in Part II.B, 
however, current antitrust enforcement policy might allow for price 
fixing in ACO arrangements, provided that network integration results in 
net efficiencies and that the price agreements are necessary to achieve 
those efficiencies.121 Additionally, even if ACO providers do not engage 
in express horizontal price fixing, they may nonetheless negotiate jointly 
 
 114. See Greaney, supra note 12, at 22. 
 115. Patricia M. Bruns, An Antitrust Analysis of Accountable Care Organizations: Potential Abuses 
from Allowing Reduced Scrutiny Under the Affordable Care Act, 28 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol’y 
268, 271 (2012). 
 116. Bruns, supra note 115, at 271; see also Werbelow, supra note 101, at 375. 
 117. See Bruns, supra note 115, at 271. 
 118. See U.S. Dep’t Of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy 
in Health Care 49–52 (1996), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0000.pdf (discussing antitrust 
safety zones for provider participation in exchanges of price and cost information). 
 119. Generally, the Sherman Act prohibits contracts, combinations, and conspiracies which 
unreasonably restrain competition. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2016). Under the Sherman 
Act, certain business practices are considered so inherently anticompetitive that they are presumed 
“per se illegal” without any additional inquiry as to the actual effect on the market. Alternatively, 
other matters of concern are reviewed under the “rule of reason” standard which, as discussed infra 
Part II.B.1, requires a more searching analysis that evaluates overall whether a practice is 
anticompetitive. 
 120. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940). 
 121. See Bruns, supra note 115, at 278. 
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and collude on prices with private payers.122 Short of reaching an actual 
agreement on prices, competing providers within ACOs are well 
positioned to exchange or disseminate information that either relates to 
or might affect the prices they charge.123 For example, ACOs may share 
pricing and reimbursement surveys of all member provider charges and 
dealings with health plans, allowing competing providers within the ACO 
to use this information in negotiations with health plans.124 ACOs that 
include multiple hospitals might also foster an environment in which 
hospitals competing for specific types of employees would be able to 
exchange information about wages, or in which competing hospitals 
might exchange cost and price information on goods and services from 
vendors.125 Given the ambiguities and related difficulties of current health 
care antitrust enforcement, such conduct raises similar anticompetitive 
concerns, but would not be as easily detectable and perhaps not be even 
permitted under antitrust law.126 
B. Antitrust Treatment of MSSP ACOs 
Many, if not most, provider markets today are characterized by high 
levels of concentration due to repeated waves of increased merger and 
acquisition activity stretching over the last thirty years.127 Some legal 
analysts have attributed this failure to contain provider consolidation to 
inconsistency and underenforcement of antitrust law by the federal 
agencies.128 With respect to MSSP ACOs, there appears to be at least a 
slight relaxation of typical antitrust enforcement, likely as a pragmatic 
effort to avoid chilling provider participation in the program.129 However, 
the primary concern with antitrust law might be that it is inherently 
limited in its ability to alone deal with consolidation and market power in 
the ACO context. This Subpart analyzes the current enforcement policy 
guidance available for the MSSP, highlighting the aspects that reflect 
relaxed antitrust treatment for MSSP ACOs. It then goes on to discuss 
why it is difficult for antitrust law to address provider consolidation that 
has already occurred and explains why antitrust law may not be the best 
approach to prevent and address market power concerns that arise as a 
result of the MSSP. 
 
 122. See Werbelow, supra note 101, at 376. 
 123. John J. Miles, 2 Health Care and Antitrust Law § 15:4 (2015). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Werbelow, supra note 101, at 376. 
 127. See Thomas L. Greaney, The Tangled Web: Integration, Exclusivity, and Market Power in 
Provider Contracting, 14 Hous. J. Health L. & Pol’y 59, 62 (2014). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 60.  
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1. Antitrust Enforcement Policy 
The agencies tasked with enforcing federal antitrust law, the DOJ 
and the FTC, rely on rule-oriented regulation in their enforcement of 
health care laws. Through policy statements, negotiated consent decrees, 
advisory opinions and speeches, these agencies provide business 
stakeholders guidance to outline and clarify their enforcement approach 
to investigating particular types of transactions.130 Yet, in providing this 
guidance, the agencies tread carefully so as to avoid being overly 
prescriptive, occasionally resulting in ambiguous and uncertain enforcement 
policies.131 As Professor Thomas Greaney has commented, this ambiguity 
can cut two ways: “it can result in overdeterrence in the sense that 
providers are reluctant to undertake procompetitive arrangements, or it 
can cause under-deterrence, meaning providers will form over-inclusive 
networks that have the power to charge supra competitive prices and 
inhibit formation of rivalrous networks or ACOs.”132 Current federal 
health care antitrust enforcement policies and practices suggest that the 
latter approach seems to be the case thus far, and as this Subpart 
discusses, the Antitrust Agencies may be affording too much special 
treatment to MSSP ACOs. 
Federal health care antitrust enforcement policy is, for the most 
part, laid out in the Antitrust Agencies’ joint Statements of Antitrust 
Enforcement Policy in Health Care (“Health Care Statement”).133 In 
reviewing most health care provider mergers and collaborations, the 
enforcement agencies consider several threshold questions: (1) Whether 
the proposed arrangements offer the potential for consumer cost savings 
or health care quality improvements; (2) Whether providers are seeking 
to establish a bona fide integration, or merely seeking to enhance 
leverage with payers through joint negotiation; and (3) Whether any 
price agreements or other agreements regarding dealing with insurers are 
reasonably necessary to achieve the efficiencies and other benefits of the 
arrangement.134 If the answer to each of these questions is “yes,” the 
arrangement is not considered per se illegal, and instead is evaluated 
under the “rule of reason” standard, which assesses whether the likely 
procompetitive effects of the arrangement outweigh the anticompetitive 
harms.135 This rule of reason analysis generally follows the same 
framework outlined in the Antitrust Agencies’ joint Horizontal Merger 
 
 130. Id. at 88–89. 
 131. Id. at 89.  
 132. Id. at 88. 
 133. U.S. Dep’t Of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 118. 
 134. Deborah L. Feinstein, Dir., Bureau of Competition, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Address at Fifth 
National Accountable Care Organization Summit—Washington, D.C.: Antitrust Enforcement in 
Health Care: Proscription, Not Prescription 4 (June 19, 2014). 
 135. Id. 
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Guidelines,136 “defining relevant product and geographic markets, 
identifying market participants, calculating market shares and 
concentration, considering the likelihood of expansion by existing 
players or entry by new players, and determining whether efficiencies 
will likely result.”137 
The Antitrust Agencies relaxed these policies for evaluating health 
care transactions even further in considering the antitrust implications of 
MSSP ACOs. The enforcement policies applied specifically to the MSSP 
are outlined in the Antitrust Agencies joint “Statement of Antitrust 
Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations 
Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program” (“MSSP 
Statement”).138 Through this statement, the Agencies attempt to strike a 
balance between (1) clarifying review procedures and standards to 
encourage, rather than deter, procompetitive arrangements; and 
(2) exercising effective oversight over anticompetitive effects, such as 
consolidation, that might lessen competition in private markets.139 As stated 
in a portion of the MSSP Statement: 
The antitrust laws treat naked price-fixing and market-allocation 
agreements among competitors as per se illegal. Joint price agreements 
among competing health care providers are evaluated under the rule of 
reason, however, if the providers are financially or clinically integrated 
and the agreement is reasonably necessary to accomplish the 
procompetitive benefits of the integration.140 
On the issue of clinical integration, the agencies chose to defer to 
CMS’s eligibility criteria, determining that meeting these requirements is 
largely “consistent with the indicia of clinical integration” set forth in 
prior antitrust advisory opinions, and that organizations eligible for the 
MSSP “are reasonably likely to be bona fide arrangements intended to 
improve the quality and reduce the costs, of providing medical and other 
health care services.”141 Accordingly, ACOs meeting CMS’s standard for 
participation in the MSSP are presumed to meet the above threshold 
considerations and are automatically reviewed under the rule of reason 
standard as opposed to the per se standard of illegality.142 Furthermore, 
where ACOs are deemed eligible for the MSSP, joint negotiations with 
private payers will be treated as reasonably necessary to an ACO’s 
 
 136. The Horizontal Merger Guidelines are the set of policies published as guidance by the 
Antitrust Agencies concerning their approach to investigating and reviewing horizontal acquisitions 
and mergers for antitrust issues. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines (2010). 
 137. Feinstein, supra note 134. 
 138. Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy, supra note 18. 
 139. See Greaney, supra note 12, at 22. 
 140. Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy, supra note 18, at 67,027. 
 141. Id. at 67,027–28. 
 142. Id. at 67,027. 
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primary purpose of improving health care delivery.143 Thus, through these 
statements, the antitrust enforcement agencies afford special relaxed 
treatment to mergers and collaborations among health care providers to 
form MSSP ACOs, assuming that once an ACO is formed, such 
transactions were adequately geared toward—and essential to—legitimate 
goals of increased efficiency. 
The MSSP Statement represents a significant departure from prior 
agency enforcement policies. Previously, the FTC was responsible for 
making these sorts of determinations regarding clinical integration on a 
case-by-case basis.144 Under the MSSP Statement, however, the decision 
is largely taken out of the agencies’ hands, such that CMS eligibility 
approval “essentially amounts to an ex ante finding of sufficient 
integration—and procompetitive justification—to their analysis of 
commercial markets.”145 By adopting this deferential approach, the 
enforcement agencies have opted for a more pragmatic standard. While 
less rigorous, it encourages program participation by dispelling the 
uncertainty of a multifactor, case-by-case evaluation.146 
The Enforcement Statement also establishes a “safety zone” for 
MSSP ACOs consisting of multiple independent participants, including 
ACOs that plan to operate in the private commercial market.147 For an 
MSSP ACO to fall within the safety zone, “independent ACO 
participants that provide the same service . . . must have a combined 
share of 30 percent or less of each common service in each participant’s 
[primary service area], wherever two or more ACO participants provide 
that service to patients from that PSA.”148 A primary service area 
(“PSA”) is defined as “the lowest number of postal zip codes from which 
the [ACO participant] draws at least 75 percent of its [patients]” and is 
the metric the Antitrust Agencies uses to define the geographic limits in 
which market concentration is measured.149 Additionally, regardless of its 
PSA, “any hospital or ambulatory surgery center (“ASC”) participating 
in an ACO must be nonexclusive to the ACO to fall within the safety 
zone.”150 ACOs meeting these requirements are deemed “highly unlikely 
to raise significant competitive concerns,” and except under 
extraordinary circumstances, the enforcement agencies will not challenge 
 
 143. See Greaney, supra note 12, at 23. 
 144. Douglas E. Rosenthal et al., Affordable Care Act Signals New Direction for Antitrust 
Enforcement in Healthcare, Bureau Nat’l Aff. Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep., June 24, 2011, at 5. 
 145. Id. 
 146. See Greaney, supra note 12, at 25. 
 147. Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy, supra note 18, at 67,032. 
 148. Id. at 67,028. 
 149. Id. The geographic region a PSA defines has no relationship to the “geographic market” 
defined in a standard antitrust merger review. 
 150. Id. at 67,028–29. 
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them.151 Nonetheless, ACOs that fall outside of the safety zone might still 
be procompetitive and legal.152 
First, the MSSP Statement describes conduct to avoid regardless of 
whether PSA shares fall inside or outside the safety zones: 
Regardless of an ACO’s PSA shares or other indicia of market power, 
significant competitive concerns can arise when an ACO’s operations 
lead to price-fixing or other collusion among ACO participants in their 
sale of competing services outside the ACO. For example, improper 
exchanges of prices or other competitively sensitive information among 
competing participants could facilitate collusion and reduce competition 
in the provision of services outside the ACO, leading to increased prices 
or reduced quality or availability of health care services. ACOs should 
refrain from, and implement appropriate firewalls or other safeguards 
against, conduct that may facilitate collusion among ACO participants 
in the sale of competing services outside the ACO.153 
For ACOs with high PSA shares or signs of market power, the 
Antitrust Agencies identify four types of conduct that may raise 
anticompetitive concerns because they “may prevent private payers from 
obtaining lower prices and better quality service for their enrollees.”154 
The conduct to avoid includes: 
(1) Preventing or discouraging private payers from directing or 
incentivizing patients to choose certain providers, including providers 
that do not participate in the ACO, through “anti-steering,” “anti-
tiering,” “guaranteed inclusion,” “most-favored-nation,” or similar 
contractual clauses or provisions. 
(2) Tying sales (either explicitly or implicitly through pricing 
policies) of the ACO’s services to the private payer’s purchase of other 
services from providers outside the ACO (and vice versa), including 
providers affiliated with an ACO participant (for example, an ACO 
should not require a purchaser to contract with all of the hospitals 
under common ownership with a hospital that participates in the ACO). 
(3) Contracting on an exclusive basis with ACO physicians, 
hospitals, ASCs, or other providers, thereby preventing or discouraging 
those providers from contracting with private payers outside the ACO, 
either individually or through other ACOs or analogous collaborations. 
(4) Restricting a private payer’s ability to make available to its 
health plan enrollees cost, quality, efficiency, and performance 
information to aid enrollees in evaluating and selecting providers in the 
health plan, if that information is similar to the cost, quality, efficiency, 
and performance measures used in the Shared Savings Program.155 
 
 151. “Extraordinary circumstances” may include, “for example, ACO participants engaging in 
collusion or improper exchanges of price information or other competitively sensitive information with 
respect to their sale of competing services outside the ACO.” Id. at 67,028 n.24. 
 152. Id. at 67,028. 
 153. Id. at 67,029. 
 154. Id. at 67,030. 
 155. Id. 
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Overall, stakeholders and commentators view the provisions 
delineating antitrust safety zones and other high risk behavior as a slight 
to moderate relaxation of the antitrust laws.156 Of particular concern is 
the use of PSA as the primary measure of market power in the safety 
zones, as the Antitrust Agencies admittedly state that PSA “does not 
necessarily constitute a relevant antitrust geographic market.”157 As one 
commentator has warned, this could “inevitably result in unintended 
consequences not stemming from competitive influences,” and that, for 
example, PSA shares might be sensitive to changes in patient 
demographics.158 Furthermore, Thomas Greaney notes that the areas of 
conduct identified as raising competitive concerns require “notoriously high 
evidentiary burdens” and that these issues involve unsettled areas of the law 
that will be even more complicated in the ACO context.159 
Critics of the MSSP regulatory framework also emphasize that 
neither the Enforcement Statement nor other existing regulations impose 
any form of premerger review by the enforcement agencies, and instead, 
any newly formed ACO seeking additional guidance must voluntarily 
request expedited review.160 As a result, antitrust review is relegated to 
the aftermath of provider consolidation and any anticompetitive effects 
that result.161 Considering many anticompetitive effects might not be 
apparent until well after providers consolidate under the MSSP, 
participating providers might ultimately enhance their bargaining power 
with little danger of later being broken up.162 Overall, current antitrust 
enforcement policy, as reflected in the MSSP Statement and the 
regulatory efforts of CMS, does not go far enough to prevent 
consolidation. The next Subpart explains why the Antitrust Agencies 
have and will continue to find it inherently difficult to limit providers that 
are permitted to consolidate from acting on any resulting increases in 
market power. 
2. The Limits of Antitrust Law 
As discussed above, relatively light antitrust enforcement policy will 
allow most MSSP ACOs, including those involving potentially dangerous 
provider mergers, to survive agency review. Once a merged entity has 
gained market power, however, the Antitrust Agencies might find it 
extremely difficult to later either undo the underlying merger or prevent 
the exercise of that market power. Indeed, a common misunderstanding 
 
 156. See Bruns, supra note 115, at 271; see also Greaney, supra note 12, at 5–6. 
 157. Bruns, supra note 115, at 281. 
 158. Id. at 282. 
 159. Bruns, supra note 115, at 284–87; see also Greaney, supra note 12, at 31. 
 160. Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy, supra note 18, at 67,030. 
 161. See Werbelow, supra note 101, at 389. 
 162. See Greaney, supra note 12, at 27. 
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among policymakers is that antitrust law can reliably counteract legally 
acquired monopoly power.163 Thus far, no MSSP ACOs have been the 
subject of antitrust challenges. However, several antitrust actions in the 
health care industry within the past several years reflect the difficulty in 
addressing consolidation after it has already occurred. 
Once a merger has been consummated and is later found to be 
anticompetitive, the Antitrust Agencies’ preferred remedy is to require 
that a portion of the surviving entity be divested, or sold, to reduce the 
merged entities market power. While the Agencies have each had some 
success in bringing actions for divestiture, this particular remedy can 
have limited applicability and effectiveness in restoring competition.164 
This is best demonstrated by the FTC’s retrospective challenge of 
Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corporation’s (“Evanston”) acquisition 
of Highland Park Hospital in the Chicago, Illinois, area in 2000.165 After 
bringing the challenge in 2004, the FTC found strong evidence that 
Evanston had significantly raised prices throughout the local market 
without improving the quality of care.166 By the time the FTC resolved 
the action in 2007, however, significant integration had already occurred 
and divestiture posed a potential risk to patient safety. As a result, the 
FTC ultimately concluded that it would be impossible to return the two 
providers to their premerger status and had little choice but to allow the 
merger to persist.167 In the context of the MSSP, there is the same 
possibility that “strong evidence” of anticompetitive effects will not be 
available until years after formation and operation, especially 
considering the fact that MSSP ACOs are not required to collect and 
disclose data pertaining to non-Medicare beneficiaries.168 As in the 
Evanston case, divestitures among MSSP ACO providers might not even 
be a practical remedy to reverse problematic consolidation where 
substantial and irreversible integration has occurred, and will depend on 
the availability of data and other evidence of anticompetitive effects. 
More recently, the FTC’s challenge of a merger between two 
physician groups in Idaho illustrated the complications that can arise 
even in the aftermath of a divestiture order.169 In 2012, St. Luke’s Health 
System, a system with four hospitals and both employed and affiliated 
physicians throughout Idaho, acquired Saltzer Medical Group, the 
largest multi-specialty physician group in Idaho.170 The resulting entity 
 
 163. See id. at 27–28. 
 164. See Feinstein, supra note 134, at 14. 
 165. See In re Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., No. 9315, slip op. at 35 (F.T.C. Aug. 6, 2007). 
 166. Id. 
 167. See Bays, supra note 58, at 15. 
 168. See Medicare Shared Savings Program, 42 C.F.R. § 425 (2016); Medicare Shared Savings 
Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,802, 67,841–43 (Nov. 2, 2011). 
 169. See St. Alphonsus Med. Ctr. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., 778 F.3d 775, 781–82 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 170. Id. 
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both had a strong reputation and possessed eighty percent of the adult 
primary care physicians in Nampa, Idaho, empowering it with significant 
bargaining leverage over health insurance companies to negotiate higher 
reimbursement rates.171 The court agreed with the FTC that this would 
produce anticompetitive effects in the form of higher premiums for 
consumers and ordered a divestiture, a decision that was affirmed by the 
Ninth Circuit in February of 2012.172 With nearly a year having passed 
since that order, and three years since the merger was consummated, St. 
Luke’s has yet to comply with the order and recently reported that 
“‘what may have seemed like a simple, straightforward process at the 
time that divestiture was ordered, has proven not to be so.’”173 
This dispute reflects the primary difficulty with the divestiture of a 
large health care entity: finding an appropriate buyer that has the 
resources to not only purchase, but also to maintain, a complex network 
of relationships among payers and patients.174 To add to these 
complications, there is increasing evidence that divestitures often fail to 
fully restore competition. For example, a recent study by Northeastern 
University Professor John Kwoka examined decades of reliable empirical 
studies of the effect of mergers, finding that divestitures often failed to 
preserve competition and were not generally effective in restraining price 
increases.175 Most of the mergers Professor Kwoka examined resulted in 
competitive harm, which usually took the form of increased prices. In 
fact, “[f]or all cases in which the agencies challenged mergers, the 
outcome was . . . an average price increase of 7.71[%].”176 More 
specifically, divestiture remedies were associated with price increases of 
6.11%, indicating they are at least moderately inadequate, while conduct 
remedies resulted in price increases of 12.81%, “suggesting that these are 
largely ineffective in restraining post-merger price increases.”177 Other 
significant findings included an estimated 4% decrease in quality and a 
 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Lisa Schencker, Court-Ordered Breakup Is Still Hard to Do, Modern Healthcare (July 17, 
2015), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20150717/NEWS/150719929. On December 10, 2015, 
the Federal District Court of Idaho issued an order setting a deadline of sixty days to complete St. 
Luke’s divestiture of its Saltzer assets and appointing a trustee to facilitate the transaction in the event 
St. Luke’s fails to do so. See Order to Maintain Assets and Appointing a Monitor and a Divestiture 
Tr., Nos. 1:12-cv-00560-BLW, 1:13-cv-00116-BLW (Dist. Ct. Idaho, Dec. 10, 2015). 
 174. The State of Competition in the Health Care Marketplace: The Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act’s Impact on Competition: Hearing on Health Consolidation Before the Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Thomas L Greaney, Professor of Law at Saint Louis 
University School of Law). 
 175. John Kwoka, Mergers, Merger Control, and Remedies: A Retrospective Analysis of 
U.S. Policy 156 (2015) (discussing divestiture remedies in product markets associated with price 
increases). 
 176. Id. at 159. 
 177. Id. 
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9.73% decrease in research and development.178 Tellingly, challenged 
mergers that were eventually permitted through consent agreements 
resulted in price increases that, on average, were no less than those 
where a merger was cleared from the start.179 As these results make clear, 
Professor Kwoka’s study supports the inference that enforcement actions 
by the Antitrust Agencies “are not demonstrably effective in preventing 
post-merger harm.”180 
Thus, divestiture might not always provide a reliable solution for 
consolidation under the MSSP that is later found to be anticompetitive, 
especially considering the complex nature of ACO arrangements among 
providers, Medicare, and other private health plans. Where structural 
remedies such as divestiture are not practical, the Antitrust Agencies 
resort to “conduct” or “behavioral” remedies that place conditions on 
the merged entity, including price caps, limits on future acquisitions, 
rules for contracting with providers, and government monitoring and 
oversight.181 The Antitrust Agencies, however, have rarely employed 
conduct remedies such as these because they not only rely on resource-
intensive enforcement, but also fail to address the underlying problem of 
reduced competition where a merger is permitted.182 
The success of health care reform will largely depend on 
competitive markets, and if the MSSP is to achieve its goal of controlling 
health care costs and improving quality, it will require stricter antitrust 
enforcement. Given the inherent difficulties that antitrust law will face in 
both imposing and implementing such remedies, the simple conclusion 
might be to “just say no” to consolidation where large providers are 
involved.183 Nonetheless, some degree of consolidation might be 
beneficial and in line with the goals of health care reform. Keeping this in 
mind, the next Part proposes modifications to the current MSSP 
regulatory scheme that would not only improve regulatory efforts to 
 
 178. Id. at 156–57. 
 179. Id. at 159. 
 180. Id. 
 181. See Feinstein, supra note 134, at 14–15. 
 182. For example, earlier this year, in Commonwealth v. Partners Healthcare System, Inc., a 
Massachusetts court rejected a settlement agreement between merging hospitals and the state attorney 
general. Commonwealth v. Partners Healthcare Sys., Inc., No. SUCV2014-02033-BLS2, 2015 WL 
500995 (Mass. Super. Ct., Jan. 30, 2015). The court explained that such a conduct remedy “permits 
consolidation and then attempts to limit the consequences that flow from that by imposing certain 
restrictions on the defendant’s behavior” and thus “require[s] constant and vigilant monitoring.” Id. at 
22, 25. The court further stated that “the remedies that are proposed are temporary and limited in 
scope—like putting a band-aid on a gaping wound that will only continue to bleed (perhaps even more 
profusely) once the band-aid is taken off.” Id. at 2. See also Press Release, Martha Healey Mass. Att’y 
Gen., AG Final Resolution with Partners Would Alter Provider’s Negotiating Power, Restrict Growth 
and Health Costs (June 24, 2014) (on file with author). 
 183. See David A. Balto, Health Insurance Merger Frenzy: Why DOJ Must Just Say ‘No,’ Law360 
(Aug. 17, 2015, 5:59 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/683500/health-insurance-merger-frenzy-why- 
doj-must-just-say-no. 
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prevent anticompetitive consolidation, but also better position CMS and 
the Antitrust Agencies to jointly mitigate harms that might arise where 
consolidation is permitted. 
III.  Leveraging MSSP Eligibility to Address Pricing Power 
Certainly, the DOJ and FTC have a critical role to play in the 
ongoing health care reforms, but it is important to recognize what these 
agencies can and cannot do. As the previous Part makes clear, the 
Antitrust Agencies’ enforcement efforts may serve a crucial role in 
preventing mergers outside the MSSP Statement safety zones, as well as 
specific types of anticompetitive conduct within MSSP ACOs. Yet, 
where providers have already consolidated, an antitrust approach is 
inherently limited in that it cannot address legitimate exercises of pricing 
power and will encounter difficulty in reversing or applying other 
remedies to a merger that is later found to be anticompetitive.184 
Furthermore, relying on antitrust litigation for issues of anticompetitive 
contractual agreements, tying arrangements, and exclusionary 
contracting involves unsettled areas of the law that are perhaps too fact 
intensive, expensive, and time consuming to be practical.185 Ultimately, 
both the antitrust policy outlined in the MSSP Statement first discussed 
in Part II of this Note as well as current MSSP regulations focus too 
much on post-merger remedies that are not well suited to address the 
underlying problems associated with extant provider market power. 
Considering the difficulties of resolving these issues with antitrust law 
alone, the best solution for preventing anticompetitive consolidation and 
market power is a more comprehensive regulatory approach to the 
MSSP framework itself. 
In June 2015, CMS issued the second Final Rule to the MSSP (“2015 
Final Rule”), amending regulations last updated in November 2011 
(“2011 Final Rule”).186 Among the key provisions, the rule allowed MSSP 
ACOs in the Track One to remain there for a total of up to six years, 
refined the beneficiary assignment model, established a new Track Three 
risk model, and introduced alternative methods for establishing and 
updating financial benchmarks.187 Understandably, policymakers were 
concerned with maintaining and encouraging further participation in the 
MSSP program, and for good reason. Despite proposing many much 
needed adjustments to the program, however, the 2015 Final Rule falls 
short in that it again dismissed the problem of market consolidation and 
pricing power among MSSP ACOs. 
 
 184. Greaney, supra note 12, at 34–35. 
 185. Id. at 35. 
 186. Medicare Shared Savings Program, 42 C.F.R. § 425 (2015). 
 187. Jessica L. Russell, Will the ACO Proposed Rule Save the Shared Savings Program?, Lexology (Feb. 
20, 2015), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=5c26d36a-4b6c-4693-91c3-640445d0d05d. 
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As discussed above in Part I, the ACO model is unique, has already 
enjoyed a moderate degree of success, and has the potential to transform 
the U.S. health care system to not only deliver better quality, but also 
more affordable health care. And because ACOs are experimental in 
nature, some relaxation of antitrust policy and a cautious regulatory 
framework are not only reasonable, but to an extent necessary. However, 
this deferential system of antitrust review should not be allowed to 
continue in this fashion considering the risk of potentially irreversible 
effects on health care competition and pricing.188 Under these 
circumstances, the MSSP is severely in need of protections that not only 
scrutinize and prohibit potentially anticompetitive consolidation, but also 
position both CMS and the Antitrust Agencies to more effectively 
mitigate the risks of consolidation where it is permitted. 
Given the success and growth in the MSSP in just its first three 
years, this Note proposes that CMS address the provider consolidation 
and market power problem by revising its eligibility requirements. More 
specifically, CMS should further condition a prospective ACO’s 
participation in the MSSP on the ACO’s disclosure of additional data, 
information, and agreements, relating to both public and private payers 
and patients. This Part first details the concepts of mandatory and 
voluntary antitrust review under the MSSP, the two mechanisms that 
were intended—but in their own ways, have failed—to address antitrust 
concerns. It then proposes that CMS draw from both review systems in 
modeling a framework for mandatory disclosures and discusses what 
these might include. These recommendations attempt to strike the 
appropriate balance between the rigidity of mandatory antitrust review, 
and the impracticality of an unused system of voluntary review. In doing 
so, regulation and enforcement efforts by CMS and the Antitrust Agencies 
could better synergize to avoid chilling potentially procompetitive ACO 
arrangements while also accounting for the limits of antitrust policy in 
reversing or preventing the exercise of provider pricing power. 
A. “Mandatory” and “Voluntary” Antitrust Review 
Throughout the notice and comment period preceding the 2015 
Final Rule, many commentators suggested that a possible solution for 
addressing the consolidation and pricing power problem could be to 
evaluate ACOs for market power as a condition of acceptance into the 
program.189 This notion of “mandatory review,” however, is not 
necessarily a new suggestion. Indeed, one of the most significant 
shortcomings of the original 2011 Final Rule was CMS’s decision to drop 
 
 188.  See Berenson, supra note 7, at 720.  
 189. Travis Broome, Stakeholders Agree on Major Updates to the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 
Am. J. Accountable Care (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.ajmc.com/publications/AJAC/2015/2015-vol3-n1/ 
Stakeholders-Agree-on-Major-Updates-to-the-Medicare-Shared-Savings-Program#sthash.1Cobi4Pw.dpuf. 
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a proposed mandatory antitrust review process as a prerequisite for entry 
to the MSSP.190 CMS originally envisioned mandatory review as a way to 
subject ACOs comprised of dominant providers to close antitrust 
scrutiny.191 In doing so, such a process would discourage and prevent the 
formation of ACOs poised to gain significant market power, while also 
providing the antitrust agencies with additional information to deal with 
anticompetitive conduct early on.192 In the proposed 2011 rule,193 CMS 
asserted that such a process would encourage private market competition 
while upholding the interest of Medicare: 
First, it would ensure that ACOs participating in the Shared Savings 
Program would not present competitive problems that could subject 
them to antitrust challenge that may prevent them from completing the 
term of their agreement with us. Second, it would maintain 
competition for the benefit of Medicare beneficiaries by reducing the 
potential for the creation of ACOs with market power. In this context 
market power refers to the ability of an ACO to reduce the quality of 
care furnished to Medicare beneficiaries and/or to raise prices or 
reduce the quality for commercial health plans and enrollees, thereby 
potentially increasing providers’ incentives to provide care for private 
enrollees of higher-paying health plans rather than for Medicare 
beneficiaries . . . . Furthermore, competition benefits the Shared 
Savings Program by allowing the opportunity for the formation of two 
or more ACOs in an area. Competition among ACOs can accelerate 
advancements in quality and efficiency. All of these benefits to 
Medicare patients would be reduced or eliminated if we were to allow 
ACOs to participate in the Shared Savings Program when their 
formation and participation would create market power.194 
In its 2011 Final Rule, however, CMS and the enforcement agencies 
withdrew the mandatory review requirement after receiving a number of 
criticisms.195 Some commenters argued that mandatory review presented 
subdelegation concerns under the Administrative Procedure Act by 
conveying unreviewable authority to the Antitrust Agencies to refuse 
MSSP applicants, when the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services alone was attributed oversight of the program.196 Others 
objected that the process would be time-consuming and costly for the 
Agencies, while also imposing entry-inhibiting costs on ACOs.197 Finally, 
 
 190. Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,802, 67,841–44 (Nov. 2, 2011). 
 191. Id. 
 192. Greaney, supra note 12, at 32. 
 193. Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,841–42. 
 194. Id. 
 195. See Greaney, supra note 12, at 33. 
 196. Under the ‘‘subdelegation doctrine,’’ courts limited the ability of federal agencies to transfer 
their statutory authority to third-party entities, including other federal agencies. Richard D. Raskin et 
al., Delegation Dilemma: Can HHS Require Medicare ACOs to Undergo Pre-Clearance by the Antitrust 
Agencies?, Health L. Rep. (BNA), June 23, 2011, at 2; see also Greaney, supra note 12, at 33. 
 197. See Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,841–42; see also Greaney, supra 
note 12, at 33. 
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some commenters argued that it would simply be “bad public policy to 
change the nature of antitrust enforcement from law enforcement to a 
regulatory regime.”198 For the most part, the critics of mandatory review 
made a number of legitimate points; however, by completely discarding 
this mandatory review process, CMS precluded the opportunity to 
negotiate with prospective MSSP participants and insist upon binding 
conditions of participation as is commonly done in consent decrees and 
merger cases, as discussed further below.199 
In place of mandatory review, CMS implemented a system of 
voluntary expedited antitrust review.200 Under voluntary review, newly 
formed MSSP ACOs seeking additional guidance can voluntarily request 
expedited review to be completed within ninety days.201 Then, to the 
extent possible in the ninety day review period, the Antitrust Agencies 
will consider factors in the rule of reason analysis and provide guidance 
as to whether the MSSP ACO presents any concern for further review.202 
The advantage of a voluntary system of antitrust review is immediately 
apparent: it is significantly less burdensome for both the ACOs and the 
Antitrust Agencies. Furthermore, the voluntary disclosure process 
requires that ACOs monitor and produce a wealth of documentation and 
other information, including: (1) the MSSP application and all supporting 
documents that the ACO plans to submit, or has submitted, to CMS; 
(2) documents discussing the ACO’s business strategies or plans to 
compete in the Medicare and commercial markets; and (3) any other 
documents and information an ACO believes might be helpful to the 
Agency in assessing the ACO’s likely impact on competition.203 
In opting for the voluntary review process, CMS lost a crucial 
opportunity to screen potentially anticompetitive ACOs, as well as to 
negotiate agreements to prevent these organizations from using their size 
to drive up prices in the commercial market. Furthermore, opting for this 
process precluded CMS from streamlining the collection of the types of 
data listed above. Despite the many useful items of information listed as 
required in the voluntary review process, as one legal analyst observed, 
“it is highly unlikely that an ACO engaging in anticompetitive behaviors 
is going to voluntarily seek expedited review.”204 Since the inception of 
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voluntary expedited review, only two ACOs have requested review,205 
and of those two applicants, one withdrew its request prior to the actual 
review, and the other was not eligible because the applicant did not 
intend to operate in any commercial market.206 Thus, despite the fact that 
voluntary review can potentially gather useful information and is 
generally less burdensome, it does not serve the purpose preliminary 
review intended. 
B. Implementing a Policy of Mandatory Disclosures 
While imposing either mandatory or voluntary antitrust review 
upon prospective MSSP ACOs entails a number of tradeoffs, the reality 
is that neither is a practical solution to the ACO consolidation problem. 
As noted in the above Subpart, CMS instituting a system of mandatory 
review is complicated by the constitutional issue of nondelegation, while 
the current practice of voluntary review has yet to be used and thus 
serves more of a guiding role than a structured protection against either 
consolidation or market power. Accordingly, regardless of whether 
voluntary review remains an option, there is a need for regulatory 
requirements that are systematically imposed upon applicant ACOs in a 
way that prevents the harms of pricing power before they become 
irreversible or unavoidable. 
Drawing from both the mandatory and voluntary review processes 
outlined above, the most promising quality they collectively offer in 
combatting provider market power is the disclosure and compiling of 
empirical data and other information. By requiring mandatory 
disclosures of select information similar to that required in the voluntary 
review process, CMS could better monitor and make possible additional 
and more effective regulatory actions. For example, as opposed to a 
voluntary disclosure to an antitrust agency, CMS could require that 
applicants provide documentation in support of their purported business 
goals and strategies in both the Medicare and commercial markets. This 
information might include the ACO’s expected impact on prices, cost, or 
quality in both public and private markets, as well as an overview of the 
competition the ACO expects to face. Indeed, already in the 2015 Final 
Rule, CMS imposed a requirement that ACOs monitor, collect, and 
disclose claims data with respect to its Medicare beneficiaries.207 
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Moreover, CMS also conditioned MSSP participation on an ACO’s 
agreement that this claims information be disclosed to the Antitrust 
Agencies.208 By expanding the scope of the MSSP Participation 
Agreement in manners such as these, CMS would be able to accomplish 
two major goals. First, CMS would be able to proactively and more 
reliably track the progress and development of MSSP ACOs in a way 
that would hold participants more accountable for the program’s mission 
for health care reform, and such that CMS could intervene before 
substantial harm results from acquisition of market power. Second, as 
discussed in Part II above, antitrust rule of reason analysis is extremely 
fact specific and resource intensive. By gathering select information, 
CMS would be in a better position to not only flag arrangements of 
potential concern, but to streamline the process for antitrust review by 
sharing that information with the Antitrust Agencies. 
CMS should also consider imposing a number of affirmative 
obligations on the part of participant ACOs where, unless an ACO 
engaged in certain anticompetitive behaviors or abuses of pricing power, 
these obligations would not burden its operations or prospects for 
success. For example, requiring commitments, such as price increase 
caps, would account for the inherent difficulty in providing antitrust 
remedies down the road, as was the result in the Evanston case discussed 
above in Part II.B. A number of commentators have raised several 
possible measures since the MSSP came into effect. First, CMS might 
also demand a heightened showing that ACO proposals will produce 
identifiable and quantifiable efficiencies, as well as perhaps placing the 
burden of showing an absence of significant horizontal anticompetitive 
effects on the applicant.209 Another approach might involve punitive 
action to ensure ACO participants were entering into the MSSP for the 
right reasons. For example, CMS could set limits on price increases in the 
commercial market and require that increases exceeding certain 
benchmarks be justified in the way an insurance rate review commission 
might operate.210 Alternatively, CMS might incorporate monetary penalties 
to shared savings not only where quality or financial benchmarks are not 
met, but where prices to private payers increase beyond a certain extent 
and cannot be justified.211 And lastly, CMS could expand upon its 
gatekeeper role of accepting ACOs into the program to include conditional 
renewals or denials for future years based on whether participants were 
raising prices or consolidating market power.212 
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Overall, the regulatory framework governing the MSSP is in need of 
serious revisions that address provider consolidation and market power 
from the onset. By conditioning MSSP eligibility on the disclosure of 
data, information, and various agreements extending to the private 
sector as discussed above, CMS could better detect, preclude, and 
respond to antitrust concerns that have historically correlated with 
increases in provider concentration.213 Providers would likely raise concerns 
that tightening and adding to the MSSP regulations could make it overly 
burdensome, thereby chilling participation. Any burden in additional 
data collection, however, could likely be minimized with the use of 
existing medical and claims data that is already routinely and automatically 
generated for private patients by hospitals and health insurance 
companies.214 More importantly, the limited burden of information and 
data disclosures would greatly improve both CMS and the Antitrust 
Agencies’ ability to work jointly in addressing unintended concentrations of 
pricing power that could undermine the MSSP’s “three-part aim” of 
improved care delivery, improved health, and reduced growth in costs.215 
Conclusion 
Under the MSSP, ACOs have the potential to lead the 
transformation of the U.S. health care system from fragmented and costly 
to integrated and cost efficient. Yet, the same integration that promises 
coordination and efficiency stands to aggregate and concentrate market 
power in a way that diminishes competition and drives up prices. As this 
Note argues, enforcement by the Antitrust Agencies alone remains 
inadequate and is not even the best solution to the MSSP’s provider 
market power problem. While there is perhaps a need for stricter 
antitrust policy, additional regulatory efforts by CMS are necessary to 
prevent excessive and unnecessary health care provider consolidation, and 
at the very least, to place both CMS and the Antitrust Agencies in a better 
position to monitor, mitigate, and contain anticompetitive exercises of 
market power. 
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